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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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NSC-U/SM-160B

March 22, 1976

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury  
The Under Secretary of Commerce  
The Under Secretary of Health, Education  
and Welfare  
The Under Secretary of Transportation  
The Special Trade Representative  
The Chairman, Council on Environmental  
Quality  
The Administrator, Environmental  
Protection Agency  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
The Director, National Science Foundation  
The Director, United States Information  
Agency  
The Acting Executive Director, Council on  
International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Second Quarterly Report on Implementation  
of the Final Act of the Conference on  
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Attached for your comment and/or concurrence  
are a draft Memorandum for the President and second  
quarterly report on the implementation of the CSCE  
Final Act. Editorial and minor substantive comments  
may be provided to Mr. John J. Maresca, Department  
of State, 632-1358. Substantial substantive comments  
should be addressed to the Chairman in writing. Your  
response is requested by c.o.b. Tuesday, March 30.

*Power of Attorney for*  
Wreatham E. Gathright  
Staff Director

Attachments:

As stated

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Second Quarterly Report on Implementation  
of the Final Act of the Conference on  
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

This is the second quarterly report submitted  
by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on implementa-  
tion of the provisions of the Final Act of the  
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
(CSCE). It covers the period November 1, 1975 -  
January 31, 1976, and reports those actions related  
to the CSCE which have been taken since the end of  
the last reporting period.

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While the CSCE involved thirty-five states, it is also an important element of our relations with the Soviet Union. Implementation of the Final Act's provisions offers additional opportunities to engage the Soviets in areas of constructive activity where cooperation can be mutually advantageous. It also gives us new possibilities for making progress in areas such as family reunification and binational marriages which have been long-standing bilateral problems between the US and the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. The follow-up meetings set for Belgrade in 1977 will be an occasion for reviewing implementation and considering possible further steps in the CSCE context. Our approach to implementation of CSCE has been keyed to these aspects of the post-Conference situation, and to the fact that implementation is an integral part of the overall East-West equation.

The November-January reporting period can be characterized generally as one of transition from interpretation and organization to one of more

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active implementation efforts. NATO continues to be the focal point of Western coordination on CSCE implementation, with exchange of information and consultations on implementation a regular fixture on the organization's weekly agenda. The NATO International Staff prepared a report on implementation for consideration at the December 11-12 meeting of the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level. The US has participated fully in all these activities, and has urged the Allies to do the same.

The Warsaw Pact governments evidently developed guidelines for implementation at meetings of Communist Party leaders in Warsaw on December 9 and January 26-28 and of Foreign Ministers in Moscow on December 15-16. The communique of the Moscow meeting stated that the Warsaw Pact countries would "fully implement the principles and agreements" of the Final Act and would take steps to "lend more concrete substance" to European security and detente. These meetings were followed by several specific implementation steps by the Communist countries.

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The USSR on January 4 gave advance notification of a major military maneuver named Caucasus held near the Turkish-Soviet border from January 25 - February 6. The Soviets also invited observers to this maneuver from CSCE participant states in the area, including two NATO members, Greece and Turkey.

General Secretary Brezhnev, in a speech in Warsaw on December 9, called for all-European conferences on energy, transportation and the environment to continue the process of cooperation in fields covered by Basket II of the Final Act. Two Eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, have issued decrees permitting establishment of foreign business offices, in keeping with CSCE provisions on improving working conditions for businessmen, and consultations have begun at the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva on carrying out those CSCE provisions which are the responsibility of the ECE.

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In the more sensitive Basket III area, the Soviets have somewhat eased regulations governing internal travel by foreign journalists, and we have responded by easing our own regulations in a similar way. The Soviets have also taken a number of steps evidently aimed at simplifying application for emigration and reducing its cost, and have reportedly permitted delivery of some printed religious material, in accord with CSCE provisions. A Soviet official has also announced the USSR's intention to permit circulation of 18 Western newspapers, including the New York Times and Le Monde. We have no information on the conditions of distribution, but if past practice is a guide the availability of these publications is likely to be highly restricted.

Overall Eastern practices in the field of Human Rights have not changed. Dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov was denied permission to go abroad to receive his Nobel Peace Prize, and Mrs. Irina McClellan, the Soviet wife of an American citizen, has not been permitted to join her husband in the US despite

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widespread publicity and interventions by our Embassy in Moscow. Overall emigration and family reunification patterns remain about the same in the USSR and Eastern European states.

Interest in expanding cultural and educational exchanges is high in the US and in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. We have tabled draft bilateral agreements on cultural-educational-scientific exchanges with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and negotiations are going forward at differing paces depending on the different local situations. In a report to Congress, the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Cultural Exchanges has recommended that the CSCE provisions be used to increase such exchanges. However, US government funds are insufficient for such an increase at this time.

Eastern steps toward implementation have been accompanied by more energetic Communist criticism of Western implementation action. Communist representatives and Eastern propaganda have accused the West of unduly stressing the freer movement provisions

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of Basket III, while ignoring the list of principles for interstate relations, which the Eastern nations themselves consider the most important section of the Final Act. The Communists have accused the West of seeking through Basket III to intervene in their internal affairs, and of failing to carry out certain provisions of the CSCE, such as full distribution of the Final Act and easing of procedures related to travel.

✓ We believe our performance in implementing the great majority of the Final Act's provisions cannot be faulted. Nevertheless, certain US visa practices, such as exclusion of Communist party members, expose us to possible criticism for failure to "facilitate wider travel" and "gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedure for exit and entry," as called for in the Final Act. Should fees for US immigration visas be increased, as noted in the first quarterly report, we could also be criticized for failing to implement the Final Act commitment "gradually to lower . . . the fees for visas." The State Department

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Visa Office has undertaken a review comparing the provisions of the Final Act to our current practices in an attempt to identify areas in which our procedures can be improved, within the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Inability to expand our existing exchange programs with the USSR and the Eastern European states could also lead to accusations of failure to carry out the Final Act's provisions.

Activity during the reporting period suggests that the Soviet Union and its Allies have decided to take certain limited steps toward implementation of the provisions of the CSCE Final Act. However, the Eastern countries will have to come considerably closer to full implementation before the June 1977 follow-up meetings in Belgrade to satisfy Western public opinion. A serious analysis of the Final Act circulated during the reporting period by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) found that the West gained at least as much--and possibly more--in the Human Rights

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field in CSCE as the Soviets did in terms of legitimization of frontiers in Europe, but underlined the expectation of the US public that the Administration will continue to press for full implementation. The AJC report particularly noted the importance of the Belgrade follow-up meetings and of a continuing follow-up mechanism for ensuring full implementation.

At the same time, the Soviets and their allies have taken the offensive in criticizing Western implementation wherever possible in order better to defend gaps in their own implementation. The Western countries, including the US, will have to examine conscientiously their own practices in relation to CSCE commitments, and prepare themselves to respond to Eastern criticisms prior to and at Belgrade. The Belgrade meetings thus have considerable potential, not only for further constructive efforts, but also for East-West recriminations. Eastern representatives have indicated concern that such recriminations might occur. The follow-up meetings look increasingly as though they may be a complex and closely watched

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barometer of East-West relations. Our eventual approach to the Belgrade meetings will need to take into account the general state of East-West relations in mid-1977, as well as CSCE implementation.

Nevertheless, perceptions of the significance of the CSCE have continued to mature, and there has been a growing realization that the Final Act represents a Western achievement, provided it is implemented in a meaningful way. The views of Andrei Sakarov are particularly relevant to this question because of his role as spokesman for Soviet dissidents. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, delivered on his behalf on December 11 by his wife, Sakarov said in part:

"The final agreement reached at the Helsinki conference has a special claim on our attention, because here for the first time official expression is given to a nuanced approach which appears to be the only possible one for a solution of international security problems. This document contains far-reaching declarations on the relationship between international security and the preservation of human rights, freedom of information and freedom of movement.

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"These rights are guaranteed by solemn obligations entered into by the participating nations. Obviously we cannot speak here of a guaranteed result, but we can speak of fresh possibilities that can only be realized as a result of long-term planned activities, in which the participating nations, and in particular the democracies, maintain a unified and consistent attitude."

In these circumstances, the policy enunciated in your Helsinki speech, with its emphasis on implementation as the test of the CSCE, continues to represent the most cogent approach to the results of the CSCE.

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SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

November 1, 1975 - January 31, 1976

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A. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE.

1. Declaration on Principles. Guiding  
Relations between Participating States.

Differing interpretations of the principles deriving from fundamental ideological differences continue to pose difficulties for the monitoring of implementation of the principles. In a non-paper handed to the US Ambassador in Moscow on November 12, the Soviets stated that they had always observed the principles embodied in the CSCE Final Act and that there was thus no need for them to take special implementation measures with regard to the principles. This is obviously not the case, especially with regard to such CSCE principles as self-determination and respect for human rights. Similarly, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek stated during a visit to the Netherlands in November that the CSCE principles should be applied only between countries with differing social/political systems, a view which makes it possible to reconcile the CSCE principles with the Brezhnev doctrine of

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limited sovereignty for socialist states. This proposition conflicts sharply with the Final Act, which contains a specific commitment to put the principles into practice in relation "with all other participating states, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems."

The Soviets and Eastern Europeans evidently are seeking to recoup, through distorted interpretation of the Final Act, what they were compelled to concede at the CSCE negotiations in order to reach consensus on a final document containing sensitive issues desired by the West as well as by the East. The following is a review of incidents and issues which have arisen during the reporting period and which relate to the CSCE principles.

Communists Stress Certain Principles.

Despite the fact that the Final Act makes it clear that each of the 10 CSCE principles has equal status, Communist spokesmen have continued to stress the importance of certain principles, especially inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs, and to overlook or downplay sections of the principles such as respect for human rights which they find distasteful.

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Soviet Note Cites CSCE Principles.

In a diplomatic note delivered to the State Department on November 20, the Soviet Embassy in Washington asserted that "gatherings of Zionists" were permitted at the Soviet Embassy "in contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Final Act of the CSCE." The Soviet note reasoned that the CSCE principle on fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law placed responsibility on the US government to carry out its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 which outlines the special duty of receiving states "to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the Mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the Mission or impairment of its dignity." The Soviet note also cited the District of Columbia Criminal Code, and the fact that the CSCE Final Act was mentioned added nothing to the arguments made by the Embassy that it should be provided with more protection.

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Observance of Human Rights Principle.

Despite commitments undertaken in CSCE with regard to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union and other authoritarian states have altered their basic approach to human rights questions during the reporting period. The cases of Andrei Sakarov and Mrs. Irina McClellan, the Russian wife of an American citizen, are examples. In both cases Soviet citizens have applied to leave their country, a right accorded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Despite the USSR's undertaking in the CSCE to "act in conformity with" this Declaration, neither Sakarov nor McClellan have been permitted to leave. These are, of course, the best known cases because of the publicity they have received. Many other more obscure but similar situations continue to exist.

We initiated consultations with the NATO Allies on possibilities for calling attention to CSCE commitments in the human rights field during the February 1976 session of the UN Human Rights Commission

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in Geneva. These consultations resulted in a coordinated Western position on the issue at the outset of the Commission session.

Basket III and Non-Intervention.

The Soviet Union continues to complain that Western interest in Basket III subjects constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of the USSR, in contradiction to the CSCE principle on non-intervention in internal affairs. Pravda and Izvestiya have published major articles which were sharply critical of Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union, including those of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. The articles claimed that the content of these broadcasts was not in keeping with the spirit of the CSCE Final Act. In fact, the Final Act specifically expresses the hope for the continued expansion of information broadcast by radio and thus not only are our broadcasts fully in keeping with the Final Act but also, in conformity with the Final Act, the jamming of foreign broadcasts should be reduced.

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Italian-Yugoslav Border Issue Resolved.

The Italian and Yugoslav governments cited resolution of the Trieste border dispute as an example of their implementation of the CSCE principles. The Agreement, which was reached between the two countries on November 10, recognizing the existing border as permanent, was in keeping with CSCE provisions on peaceful settlement of disputes.

Cyprus Situation and the CSCE Principles.

The Cyprus situation, which was the subject of formal reservations by Cyprus and Turkey at the final stage of the CSCE, remains essentially unchanged, despite efforts of Western countries, including the US, to encourage the parties of the Cyprus dispute to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.

UK and Iceland Seek Peaceful Settlement to Fisheries Dispute.

In his speech to the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, Icelandic Prime Minister Hallgrimsson linked the CSCE principles to the need to respect Iceland's

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declaration of a 200-mile fisheries zone. The UK-Iceland fisheries dispute over UK fishing within this zone escalated during the reporting period to another "cod war" episode, despite attempts by NATO Secretary General Luns to defuse it. A decision by the two countries to return to the negotiating table would be in keeping with the CSCE principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The US and other NATO member countries have made behind-the-scenes efforts to support Luns' role in bringing this about.

Yugoslav Spokesman Cites CSCE in Relation to Angola.

An article in two Yugoslav periodicals in early January, considered to reflect the views of the Yugoslav leadership, claimed that US criticism of Soviet aid to the MPLA in Angola represented a desire to exploit the Helsinki Final Act to maintain spheres of influence, since it constituted an attempt to prevent Angola from choosing its own social system. This claim is evidently based on the commitment in the CSCE principle of Sovereign Equality to respect

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the right of states to choose and develop their own political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the CSCE provision stating the intention of the participating states to "conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles contained in the present declaration." This distorted view of the Angola situation is an example of the Yugoslav desire to extend the CSCE context to other parts of the world. Our view is obviously that if anyone is interfering in Angolan affairs, it is the Soviets and the Cubans, not the US.

The Baltic States Question.

The US House of Representatives on December 2 unanimously adopted a resolution introduced by Congressman Derwinski and 24 other Congressmen noting statements by the President and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs that the results of the CSCE had not affected the long-standing policy of the US on nonrecognition of the forceable incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. The resolution expresses the sense of the House that there has been no change in this policy and that it will continue. The resolution was passed

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after the State Department indicated informally that it would welcome this expression of support for Administration policy. An identical bill has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Curtis, but has not yet been approved.

Balkan Conference and CSCE.

The communique of the meeting of Balkan states in Athens January 26 - February 5 related that meeting to the CSCE. The Balkan Conference, which included CSCE participants Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania, has been depicted as falling under the CSCE principle that calls for cooperation among states in all fields.

World Council of Churches Resolution on  
Religious Liberty.

The Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, held in Nairobi in December, adopted a resolution requesting its Secretary General to see to it that the question of religious liberty becomes the subject of "intense consideration" with member Churches in the nations which are signatories to the

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Helsinki Final Act, and that a first report on this subject be made to the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches in August 1976. The resolution was based on the CSCE Principle of Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, and was adopted following sharp debate in which representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church expressed reservations as to the possible negative effects such an active course of action could have on the treatment of churches in the Soviet Union.

Dubcek's Foreign Minister Cites CSCE in  
Calling for More Liberal Czech Regime.

Former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, who as a member of Dubcek's government in 1968 strongly condemned Warsaw Pact occupation of the country, has reportedly written to the Czechoslovak government. Citing the CSCE Final Act, and particularly the Declaration of Principles, Hajek asked for a reevaluation of the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention and an end to discrimination against former Dubcek supporters.

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Hajek's letter evidently followed an appeal to the Czechoslovak Communist Party by 35 former reformers who, basing their view on the provisions of the CSCE, called for release of political prisoners. The Final Act has reportedly encouraged such internal opposition in Czechoslovakia.

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2. Document on Confidence Building Measures and  
Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.

Western activity under this subject heading was minimal during the reporting period, following the high number of notifications of maneuvers by NATO states during the autumn exercise period. Notification was given by Norway of one NATO exercise involving 17,000 troops.

Warsaw Pact policy on confidence building measures (CBM's) was evidently set during the reporting period, as the Soviet Union gave its first notification of a maneuver involving 25,000 men, and invited observers from neighboring countries, including two NATO members. The propaganda line of the Warsaw Pact states made an abrupt turn-around. During the fall the Communist countries had harshly criticized the West for the number of maneuver notifications given, on the grounds that such a high level of exercise activity was not in keeping with the spirit of Helsinki. Since the Soviet maneuver announcement, however, the Eastern press has been full of praise

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for the CBM provisions of the CSCE, and for Soviet fulfillment of its CBM obligations.

Prior Notification of Major Military Maneuvers.

The Soviet Union made its first notification of a major military maneuver under the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) provisions of the CSCE during the reporting period. In a letter given to our military attache in Moscow on January 4 the Soviets stated that a field maneuver called "Caucasus" involving approximately 25,000 men (the threshold for notification) would take place around the Georgian cities of Kutaisi, Yerevan and Tbilisi near the Soviet-Turkish border from January 25 to February 6, with the participation of airborne and airmobile units.

The USSR acted on its own in its first notification, as this is a national rather than a Warsaw Pact exercise. However, Eastern European desire to implement the CBM provisions may have encouraged the Soviets to do so. Although the modalities of the Soviet notification were slightly different from those of notifications made by Western countries, they fulfilled

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the commitments of the CSCE on prior notification of major maneuvers.

Prior Notification of Other Military Maneuvers.

Neither the Soviet Union nor its Warsaw Pact allies have made a "voluntary" notification of a maneuver of less than 25,000 men. The Russian exercise "Caucasus" may in fact have involved less than 25,000 troops but notification was made as for a major military maneuver.

The NATO Allies decided to make voluntary notification of exercise "Atlas Express" which took place in Norway from February 26 to March 22, 1976. The exercise involved about 17,000 troops of the Norwegian armed forces and the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force.

Exchange of Observers.

The CBM on observers encourages invitation of observers but does not require that observers be invited to all maneuvers of which notification is given, or that all signatory states be invited as was done by the FRG for exercise "Certain Trek" last

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October. The Soviets invited states in the region of the "Caucasus" maneuver to send observers: Greece and Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, and neutral Yugoslavia.

In the case of "Caucasus", the Soviet invitation stated that observers could be military attaches stationed in Moscow or could be sent from the capital of the invited state. This is a more flexible designation of observers than was used by the FRG in the case of "Certain Trek", for which only personnel accredited in Bonn were eligible. The formula used for "Certain Trek" met FRG objectives of avoiding a situation in which observers would be sent from the GDR, but may have been one factor in Warsaw Pact refusal to acknowledge or accept the invitations.

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B. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT.

1. Commercial Exchanges.
2. Industrial Cooperation and Projects of  
Common Interest.
3. Provisions Concerning Trade and Industrial  
Cooperation.
4. Science and Technology.
5. Environment.
6. Cooperation in Other Areas.
  - Transport
  - Tourism
  - Migrant Labor
  - Training of Personnel

Basket II has not received the same impetus as have other CSCE subject headings. The major participants in

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the Conference have tended to view Basket II as secondary in importance to the Declaration of Principles, Military Confidence-Building Measures and Basket III. In addition, bilateral trade and technical activity continues between Eastern and Western countries at an active pace, unrelated to CSCE. Nevertheless, the characteristic difference of approach to implementation which has been evident in other subject areas has also been apparent in Basket II, as both East and West have tended to emphasize those aspects of the Final Act provisions which support their attitudes and priorities. Thus the Western countries have stressed the need for implementation of provisions on improving working conditions for businessmen and freer availability of commercial information, while the Eastern countries have advocated the granting of MFN and projects of a general nature or in specific areas of interest to them. This difference of approach has been clear in overall position statements and proposals, bilateral dealings and in the multilateral forum of the Economic Commission for

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Europe (ECE) which was designated in the Final Act as the proper forum for implementation of a number of Basket II provisions.

Progress on all these levels has been slow thus far, but there were several important steps during the reporting period. In a speech in Warsaw on December 9, Brezhnev proposed the convening of "European congresses and international conferences on questions of cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection, the development of transport, the field of energy, and so on," in a context which suggested that he intended this idea as a form of CSCE follow-up. The same idea has subsequently been inserted in joint Soviet-Finnish and Soviet-Turkish communiques issued during state visits, and has been taken up in a number of Soviet and Eastern European press articles. The Brezhnev proposal was generally formulated and the Soviets have up to now offered no more precise explanation of what is intended.

It would not be possible until the Belgrade follow-up meetings in 1977 for the thirty-five

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CSCE participant states to agree to hold such conferences, and it will be necessary to consider carefully the advantages and disadvantages of agreeing to them at that time. It should also be noted that the location of the FRG's environmental protection agency in West Berlin poses a number of delicate problems for closer East-West cooperation in the field of the environment. Presumably the Soviets will provide more information on their proposal before Belgrade, to prepare the way for a formal proposal.

The motivation for the Brezhnev suggestion is probably multifold: a general desire to continue the forward thrust of the CSCE concept coupled with the specific desire to move out of the defensive posture which Western stress on "freer movement" issues has forced upon the Soviets; an effort to divert the implementation of the Final Act into areas which are less damaging and difficult for the Communist system to handle; and a substantive interest in beginning multilateral work in these fields.

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Limited steps forward have been made by Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, both of whom issued decrees during the reporting period permitting foreign businesses to open offices in their countries under carefully circumscribed conditions. While there are still many practical obstacles, such as availability of office space, and the Bulgarian requirement that firms deal only with the state foreign trade organizations and not with end-users, the decrees are in line with the Final Act, and are of potential significance to Western businessmen. It remains to be seen, however, what effect these decrees will have on real possibilities for doing business in these countries.

In the ECE, the principal multilateral forum for implementation of Basket II, activity has centered on preparation for the March, 1976, plenary session, which will concentrate on post-CSCE issues. The US Permanent Representative in Geneva, in a statement on November 21, set out the US view that the ECE

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should concentrate its CSCE implementation activities in the fields of business information and contacts, exchanges of information on science and technology, studies of certain environmental problems and cooperative research on certain transportation projects. The approach of the EC-Nine to ECE implementation activity has been similar to ours. Most other ECE members, including the USSR and its allies, have also indicated that they prefer the ECE to concentrate on certain implementation subjects in order to achieve some concrete accomplishments prior to the Belgrade follow-up meetings. However, the subjects chosen for emphasis are different in many cases, with the Eastern countries wishing to avoid subjects, such as the availability of commercial information, which have a "freer movement" cast.

Romania has called for greater ECE attention to the problems of developing countries, an idea which is shared by some neutrals such as Yugoslavia, but which is opposed by most of the Soviet bloc. The Executive Secretary of the ECE, Janez Stanovik, continues to press for an active ECE implementation

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role in accordance with the mandate of the Final Act, and we have indicated our support for his efforts.

Consultations among the Western countries on Basket II subjects have continued during the reporting period in the Economic Advisors Committee at NATO, among the EC-Nine, and in the Western caucus at the ECE.

Although falling outside the reporting period, it should be noted that on February 19 the GDR, acting on behalf of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), handed over to the Luxembourg government, in its capacity as President of the EC Council of Ministers, a draft agreement between CEMA and the EC, the preamble of which specifically refers to the Final Act. The Communist countries have subsequently portrayed this initiative as a form of CSCE implementation activity. It is too early to judge whether the EC will respond favorably to this CEMA proposal, which on the surface appears to have been motivated mainly by political rather than economic considerations.

Another multi-lateral forum which interested itself in Basket II subjects during the reporting

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period was the Balkan Conference on Economic and Technical Cooperation held in Athens on January 26 - February 5, 1976. The Final Communique indicates that this meeting "ascertained a common interest in the development of economic and technical cooperation" among the participants, and specifically mentions the fields of agriculture, commerce, energy, transport, telecommunications and environment as subjects on which recommendations were made. These recommendations were collated during the meeting and will be considered by the governments of the Balkan states which attended -- Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

East-West bilateral economic contacts continued apace during the reporting period. The Czechoslovak government, in a "non-paper" given to our Embassy in Prague on January 26, in response to our earlier demarche on CSCE implementation, complained about US "discrimination" against Czechoslovakia in the trade field and about the fact that MFN has not been granted to Czechoslovakia. We have taken the position that we agree MFN can be beneficial, as

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stated in the Final Act, but that we would expect effective reciprocity in any negotiations on MFN which might be held with Czechoslovakia in the future. We have also called the Czechs' attention to the Administration's efforts in this regard.

A 10-year French-Czechoslovak agreement on economic cooperation was signed in Paris during the November visit by Czechoslovak Premier Strougal. This agreement was similar to those which France has with other Eastern European countries. The Netherlands also signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia on economic, technological and industrial cooperation. During a visit by GDR Foreign Minister Fischer to Paris, France and the GDR agreed in principle to increase their bilateral trade. Economic and technical cooperation has also been discussed in high level meetings between the Turkish government and the governments of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

An item of interest under the Basket II sub-heading of tourism is the US initiative to set up

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a "Visit USA" program in the Soviet Union. This subject is discussed more fully under the Basket III section of this report.

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C. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Participating states did not, during the reporting period, relate any specific developments to the Mediterranean provisions of the Final Act, even though events have occurred that could be related to CSCE under the very general terms of the Act. For example, the settlement of the Spanish Sahara question between CSCE participant Spain and Morocco, a "non-participating Mediterranean state",\* could be depicted as conforming to the provision in the Mediterranean section calling on states to conduct friendly relations in the spirit of the CSCE principles--in this case, the principle on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

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\*The phrase in the text "non-participating Mediterranean state" refers to states which expressed interest in CSCE and were invited as guests to give their views during the Conference. These states are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

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Algeria, another "non-participating Mediterranean state", has serious reservations about the Spanish Sahara settlement. The US position on the Spanish Sahara is to urge that all parties work out their differences peacefully among themselves and without armed interference; this position could also be described as being in accord with the Mediterranean section and the CSCE principles.

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D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.

1. Human Contacts.

2. Information.

Actions taken by the US during the reporting period continued to stress our interest in implementation of the Basket III provisions on human contacts and information. During the November 1 - January 31 period we raised human contacts and information subjects, chosen with regard to the local situation, in all Eastern capitals. The results were mixed and modest at best, but there was some small progress. In several cases, these initiatives were reported to our Allies in NATO for their information and for possible use in taking actions parallel to ours; the Allies, in turn, conveyed their CSCE experiences to us.

The Soviet Union evidently made basic policy decisions on CSCE implementation in late 1975 that resulted in certain limited positive developments and changed a few Soviet procedures in some Basket III areas, including family reunification and visits,

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binational marriages, personal and professional travel, working conditions for journalists and, to a limited extent, information. There was less progress in Eastern Europe, where practice in the fields of human contacts and information is generally not as severe as in the USSR; however, some favorable, if modest, CSCE developments did occur in the Eastern European countries.

Compared to the human contacts and information situation in the East reported in the First Quarterly Report on CSCE implementation that covered the August 1 - October 31 period, there has been an Eastern, and particularly Soviet, effort to bring policies and procedures into line with CSCE provisions on human contacts and information. However, only a modest start has been made and a very great deal still must be done to fully implement the provisions of the Final Act, and it remains to be seen what impact the changes which have been made thus far will actually have on the situation of the Soviet and Eastern European peoples. The true test of implementation will be the extent to which revised procedures are carried out.

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1. Human Contacts.

Family Visits; Family Reunification; Binational  
Marriages

The family reunification question has been a major part of our bilateral approaches in all Eastern CSCE states. Ambassador Stoessel raised family reunifications with the Soviets on August 18 and October 14, but subsequent progress on this problem has been disappointing. Out of the 249 families involving 641 individuals on the US Exit Visa Representation List presented by Ambassador Stoessel in August, some 28 families with 81 persons have left the USSR with exit visas for the US. Some of these, however, left before the list was presented. Twenty-seven cases involving 61 individuals have also been deleted from the list because of emigration to Israel, current lack of interest in emigrating to the US or other related reasons. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko indicated on November 12 that family reunification is a proper subject for US-USSR discussions on CSCE implementation. The family

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reunification issue will be raised in the US-USSR talks in the coming weeks to review our Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.

Additionally, there have been reports that the Soviet Union is adapting its laws and administrative practice in order to conform to the CSCE provisions under this heading. In this regard, two visa applicants at our Embassy in Moscow recently stated that Soviet exit visa fees dropped from 400 (\$500) to 300 rubles (\$435), effective January 1. (Emigrants to Israel, however, pay an additional 500-ruble (\$725) charge for the required renunciation of Soviet citizenship.) Also, whereas applicants for travel documents in the Soviet Union previously had to pay a 40-ruble (\$58) application fee each time they applied, irrespective of how many times they were refused, they now only have to pay when the application is granted, which is in accord with a CSCE provision on this question.

Additionally, emigrants from Soviet Armenia have reported that local authorities were showing greater willingness to change the country of destination

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stamped in their passports, thereby easing one problem related to emigration. Other reported changes in Soviet procedure include a simplification of the "character reference" procedure connected with emigration, a reduction in the review period for refused applications from one year to six months, and a change in Soviet procedures in regard to travel by persons who have knowledge of state secrets, are "criminals", or who leave behind dependent children and parents. On the other hand, the tightening of Soviet regulations governing remittances from abroad will have a detrimental effect on remittances to intending emigrants and those who are refused emigration and are consequently left without work. It remains to be seen what effect these measures will have in practice.

In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the number of reunification cases is relatively small, a few persons were permitted to emigrate to join families following our representations. In the GDR, Ambassador Cooper raised the divided families question with Communist Party First Secretary Honecker in November

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and with Foreign Minister Fischer in January. There appears to be a modest increase in the number of persons permitted to leave the GDR to join relatives since the signing of the CSCE Final Act.

With respect to Poland we have not been satisfied with the level of their response to the divided family problem in the wake of Helsinki; however, Administrator Leonard F. Walentynowicz of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs discussed this at length with senior officials in Warsaw on November 20 and reports that there are some signs of movement by the Poles. If we continue to pursue these family reunification matters on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, it is possible that there may be more Polish responsiveness to the problem.

The Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs has promised to review the divided families issue, which comprises a relatively small group of people, and to contact us again on this matter. In the meantime, Bulgaria has granted permission to four persons on the divided families list to travel to the US; two

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of them were permitted to join their families permanently, the other two to visit their relatives. The reunification of divided families through emigration from Romania is related as much to the granting of MFN and the emigration commitments Romania has under the terms of the Trade Act as it is to the terms of the CSCE. Romania recently launched a propaganda campaign focused on Western economic difficulties and "decadence" in an apparent attempt to discourage those wishing to leave. Emigration from Romania declined somewhat during November, December and January. This could be a seasonal fluctuation. Nevertheless, the monthly rate during the three-month period covered by this report was higher than during the first six months of 1975. We continue to remind the Romanians of the importance of permitting a reasonable emigration flow.

The GDR was widely criticized when it came to light that children of persons apprehended while attempting to flee to the West were permanently taken away from their parents who were sent to prison. While this type of case does not come under the specific terms of the Final Act on divided families, which



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deal with families divided by national frontiers, such actions are not in keeping with the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The GDR was vigorously attacked by the media on this matter as being in violation of the spirit of the CSCE.

Given the complicated ethnic mix across national frontiers that history has left in Eastern Europe, it is not surprising that certain Communist states have addressed the divided families question among themselves. Thus, the Yugoslavs have reportedly cited the CSCE provisions in urging Bulgaria to permit Macedonians in Bulgaria to join relatives in Yugoslavia. Similarly, there is a report that in the wake of the CSCE, the number of Soviet Moldavians, who are ethnic Romanians, hoping to emigrate to join family members in Romania has increased markedly. Also, the Soviets are said to have increased the number of visas to Romanians to visit relatives in Soviet Moldavia since Helsinki.

Concerning family visits, a problem continues in some Eastern states which refuse visas to naturalized Americans who wish to visit relatives in their countries

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of origin. For example, during the reporting period our Embassy in Prague made representations on eleven such cases in the context of CSCE, but was told by a Czechoslovak official that naturalized American citizens of Czech and Slovak origin who departed Czechoslovakia "illegally" (i.e. without official permission) after 1968, could not be granted visas to visit family members. We are pursuing this matter on a case-by-case basis.

There have been reports that the Soviet Union is planning to amend laws and regulations to liberalize practice in regard to emigration and family reunification, and Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Korniyenko noted on November 12 that some family reunification and binational marriage cases had been resolved. Meanwhile, however, considerable publicity has been given to the case of the wife of an American citizen, Irina McClellan, who has been refused exit permission to depart the USSR to join her husband. Our Embassy in Moscow has raised the McClellan case several times, citing the CSCE. There

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are also several other cases in this category in the USSR. Additionally, we are following up on a case in Bulgaria where a Bulgarian married to an American citizen has been refused permission to leave Bulgaria, despite earlier promises that such permission would be given.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons;  
Consular Conventions; Religious Contacts and  
Information

The USSR has stated that journalists will be permitted wider travel in the Soviet Union; this subject is treated elsewhere in this report under Working Conditions for Journalists. The Soviets have also indicated they may be considering a reduction in the zones closed to personnel accredited to the US Embassy in Moscow. We also have under study the question of reducing, unilaterally, zones closed to Soviet personnel stationed in the US with the aim of encouraging the Soviets to take similar action. We are also proposing the elimination of closed

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zones, with the exception of areas around sensitive installations, on a reciprocal basis to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, together with the elimination of designated points of entry into the US by officials of those two countries.

Ambassador Stoessel on October 14 raised with the Soviets the question of wider travel possibilities, as well as multiple entry-exit visas, for American businessmen and students who reside in the Soviet Union; this subject will be raised again in the upcoming US-Soviet consular review. All of these steps, if taken, would be in conformity with the CSCE stipulation that states should ease regulations governing the movement of citizens from other CSCE states in their territory.

The Eastern states continue to complain about what they claim are unduly long delays in US issuance of visas and US refusal of visas in certain cases. On November 12 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko

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noted our refusal to grant visas to Soviet trade union groups and other organizations, and claimed that it takes the US longer than the USSR to issue tourist visas. The latter point has also been made to American ambassadors in Budapest and Sofia during the reporting period. We have agreed in principle with the Hungarians to reduce from 14 to 7 days the processing of visas for official Hungarian travelers. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister proposed to Ambassador Herz that the US and Bulgaria eliminate visas on a reciprocal basis, an action which he depicted as being within the spirit and letter of the CSCE. Such a move would not, however, be possible under the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which governs travel to the US and requires the issuance of US visas to foreign travelers.

The INA also governs US action in the case of Dean Cornelius Hoxsey, a former American who is now

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a Soviet citizen, and who has cited CSCE in requesting approval of his application to return to the US to be with his aged mother. Despite the terms of the CSCE, Hoxsey's membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union still renders him ineligible, under the INA, to receive a visa to return permanently to the US. The Visa Office of the Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs is reviewing the Hoxsey case in light of CSCE with a view to determining whether the Department should recommend to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it parole Hoxsey into the United States. Further, the Visa Office is, on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the provisions of CSCE in doubtful or borderline visa issuance cases. We are also reviewing visa procedures to determine what changes can be made to improve US practice, taking into account the Final Act and US law.

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We have urged the Czechoslovaks, in the context of the Final Act which calls for the conclusion of consular conventions, to ratify the US-Czechoslovak Consular Convention which would then enter into force; the Czechoslovaks replied that early action on this matter could be expected. Negotiations on the US-GDR Consular Convention continue.

As to religious contacts and exchange of information, an interesting item has been reported from our Embassy in Rome. According to the Vatican, word was received that a packet of religious material, delivered at its destination in one of the Baltic states, bore a Soviet stamp stating that the material was forwarded according to the terms of the CSCE. The Chief Rabbi of Great Britain also made a trip to the USSR at the invitation of local Jewish communities and met with Soviet officials while there. There is also a report that the Soviets will allow five Soviet rabbinical students to study in the US.

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Tourism; Meetings among Young People; Sport;  
Expansion of Contacts

American travel industry and US officials met in Washington January 27 to discuss the possibility of establishing a "Visit USA" program for the USSR. Such a program would involve establishment in Moscow of a Visit USA Committee comprised of local American businessmen and US Embassy officials. The US plans to participate in this project within the resources that are currently available for such activities.

Meetings among young people have taken place or are planned within the framework of exchange agreements which we have with the East. Examples during the reporting period were visits in November by a group of young American political leaders to Romania and Poland and by a group of young American journalists to the Soviet Union.

A European Youth Security Conference with participation by youth groups from Europe and elsewhere is scheduled to take place in Warsaw in June to discuss the CSCE and other matters. We are taking

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steps to ensure that American youth representatives are invited to preparatory meetings and to the Conference.

Several East-West events in the field of sports have taken place. The most publicized of these were the US tours in December-January of two Soviet ice hockey teams, during which one of the teams played the champion Philadelphia Flyers. Other Eastern teams that visited the US, all in November, included a Soviet heavyweight boxing team that competed in New York, Connecticut and North Carolina, a Polish equestrian team that rode in competition in Maryland and New York; and a Soviet basketball team that played American college teams in nine states.

Several American sports teams also visited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Americans participated in international swimming and figure skating competitions in Czechoslovakia in November. A team from Choate School played in volleyball matches in

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December in Poland. Finally, the American Athletic Union sent a boxing team on a tour of several cities in the USSR during January.

During the reporting period there was official Soviet criticism of US visa refusals to Soviet organizations, such as trade union groups wishing to travel to the US on official business. Such travel is covered under the Expansion of Contacts section of the Final Act. Since this section of the text results from an Eastern initiative, we may expect that the Soviets and Eastern Europeans will remain sensitive as to its implementation.

2. Information.

Oral, Printed, Filmed and Broadcast Information;

Cooperation in Field of Information

Stress was laid on Western broadcasting in relation to CSCE by the East during the reporting period. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Korniyenko complained to Ambassador Stoessel on November 12 that radio broadcasts should serve the interests of mutual understanding between peoples, that the Final Act

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text reflects this aim, and that the content of the broadcasts of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America were not fulfilling the terms of the text. The Soviet media have taken a similar line. On the other hand, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov in an exchange on CSCE with Ambassador Herz on December 29 said that the VOA is doing a creditable job in presenting the American story to the Bulgarian people. In response, we have noted that the Final Act text on broadcasting expresses the hope for a reduction of jamming, does not mention the content of broadcasts and that the Eastern states, as well as others who participated in the Conference, are well aware of this. The Final Act also commits CSCE states "to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds"; our broadcasts clearly conform with this concept.

Otherwise, a practical problem related to broadcasting has been resolved between the US and the GDR. The East Germans do not currently jam German-

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language broadcasts from West Berlin of Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) on FM and short wave, but do jam such broadcasts, with only partial success, on the highly popular medium wave. We learned that the East Germans planned to begin transmissions on the same medium wave frequency as RIAS in a manner that would have blotted out the RIAS medium wave signal, and that they were also planning to broadcast in FM on the same FM frequency used by RIAS. We raised this question in the context of CSCE with the East Germans. At the Medium Wave Conference in Geneva in November the medium wave problem was satisfactorily resolved in a cooperative spirit on the technical level, without the creation of a troublesome political problem. We remain hopeful that the FM problem can be resolved in a similar manner. We will continue to raise with the East Germans the question of jamming of the RIAS medium wave.

There have been a few developments in regard to the flow of printed information. A Tass article has quoted a Soviet press distribution official as saying

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that eighteen Western newspapers, including the New York Times, are to go on sale in the Soviet Union in 1976. Should this action be taken, it seems virtually certain, given past Soviet practice on Western news media, that the sale of such Western newspapers would be highly restricted. In a related development, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov stated December 29 that Bulgaria is importing more Western publications, but our Embassy in Sofia has, as yet, seen no evidence of an increase in numbers of titles of these publications in the marketplace. Also, a Polish diplomat told a State Department official January 21 that the Soviets consider they are implementing the CSCE provisions by allowing the US Embassy in Moscow to distribute a new US Russian-language magazine--this is evidently a reference to "Dialogue", a USIA publication, the circulation of which was discussed in the First Quarterly Report on CSCE Implementation. Finally, a minor item on information flow is the agreement in principle by the Hungarians to permit our Embassy in Budapest to send US publications through the Hungarian mail system.

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The Eastern states have developed a position on information which is based on reciprocity. In response to criticism that not enough Western publications and films are available to the public in the East, the Communist states respond that there are in fact more Western films and publications available in the East than Eastern publications and films in the West, and that the same is true in regard to listenership to international broadcasting. This position has been made during the reporting period in the Communist media, by Eastern officials to American representatives, and by East German Politburo member Albert Norden in the first GDR public statement on Basket III at the Leningrad Peace Conference in late November. There is no easy response to this Eastern position since there is in fact an imbalance to the Western advantage due to the popularity of Western materials in the East and general lack of Western interest in books as well as films from the East. The central point is, of course, that wide circulation in the West of Eastern materials is limited only by private demand while Western materials are limited in the East by governmental edict. It

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should also be noted that Western films and books shown or published in the East are evidently chosen for political reasons, and tend to convey the image of a decadent Western society. The Communists seek to make the same claim about the choice of Eastern authors or books for publication in the West, e.g., Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago.

There has been further cooperation in the field of information, similar to that outlined in the first report on CSCE implementation covering the period of August 1 - October 31. An example during this reporting period was the visit to the USSR in November of a group of twelve young American journalists under the American Council of Young Political Leaders - Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations exchange program.

Working Conditions for Journalists

On December 31 the Soviet Union announced that restrictions on the travel of Western journalists in the USSR would be reduced, effective March 1, to allow them to travel to the extent permitted Western diplomats accredited to Moscow. We informed the Soviets by note on January 19 that we were similarly relaxing travel controls on Soviet correspondents in

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the US, starting March 1. We have told the NATO Allies of this development, noting that while reciprocal action was appropriate in this case, our view remains that, with few exceptions, further implementing arrangements are unnecessary in regard to most Basket III provisions on human contacts and information. The reduction in travel controls on journalists is a significant development; and there is the possibility of still wider travel opportunities if zones closed to diplomats in the USSR are reduced, as discussed in this report under Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons.

Ambassador Stoessel raised the general question of working conditions for journalists with the Soviets on October 14. We plan to raise this question again soon, including the question of access to officials and other issues.

Czechoslovakia, sensitive to Western media stories on Czech dissidents, continues to take the harshest line on Western journalists among Eastern European states. Our Charge in Prague, in a meeting

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with Czechoslovak officials on October 31, stressed in the context of CSCE the importance we attach to press matters and treatment of American journalists. However, during the reporting period Los Angeles Times correspondent Murray Seeger was refused a visa to visit Czechoslovakia. A VOA correspondent was similarly refused, and we suspended action on the visa application of a Rude Pravo correspondent assigned to Washington in retaliation until the matter was satisfactorily resolved. Our Embassy in Prague pointed out to the Czechoslovak authorities that such visa refusals were not in conformity with CSCE provisions. Another incident involving a journalist was the expulsion of a German Der Spiegel correspondent from the GDR in connection with stories on the forced separation of families in East Germany, which is noted in this report under Divided Families.

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- D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.
3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture.
  4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education.

Trends in the pace and structure of cultural and educational activities have in large measure tended to be a function of the budgeting and program-planning element involved. As such, it is not surprising that developments in the areas of cultural and educational cooperation and exchanges during the November 1 - January 31 period reflected no sharp deviation from the slow but definite progress noted in the First Quarterly Report on CSCE Implementation. Likewise, implementation of many of the provisions under these sections of the Final Act continued during this reporting period to be channelled through primarily bilateral (but also multilateral) arrangements developed prior to the CSCE.

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It should be noted, however, that the Final Act does appear to be positively influencing the atmosphere surrounding - if not directly influencing the pace and direction of - cultural and educational arrangements. During the December 15-17 review talks on the 1975 programs under the US-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement, for example, the Soviets took occasion to make reference to the opportunities and obligations stemming from the CSCE, and appeared to be under instructions to put contentious issues in the most positive light possible and to avoid discord. New bilateral arrangements with Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia also appear on the horizon. While they were discussed prior to the CSCE, the influence of the Final Act appears to have hastened the progress noted during the reporting period in the formulation and development of bilateral science and cultural agreements with these three East European countries.

While these and other favorable developments are encouraging, we should be aware that the recently increased Eastern interest in the cultural and

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educational provisions of Basket III may largely be defensive. The East's goal may be to achieve a self-interested balance within and between baskets -- i.e., as a counterweight to the Basket III provisions relating to human contacts and information, and as movement in response to criticism of the East's emphasis on Basket I principles. Such a defensive posture would fit in with the occasional attacks noted during the reporting period on US implementation of Basket III.

As far as official US actions in this area are concerned, implementation continues to hinge primarily on the availability of funds. A no-growth situation or even possible reductions, stemming from the minimal increase in the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs budget for FY 1976, could leave the US open to charges that we are not genuinely prepared to expand relations as called for in the Final Act. As things stand now, East European countries are already showing a more aggressive attitude in pressing the US on fulfillment measures.

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The US has also found that administrative difficulties have slowed the progress of our Fulbright Lecturer exchange and have restricted our ability to choose the performing arts groups we wish to have performing in the USSR. This issue was taken up at the December review talks and it was understood that our views would be made known to the proper authorities.

The December review talks which were concluded on a constructive note, as well as discussions with Western European countries, regarding their experiences in the field of CSCE Implementation have given mixed indications of the East's intentions in the cultural and educational areas of the Final Act. Ongoing consultations with neutral countries should provide further occasion to compare views and experiences on exchanges, as will the meeting of the NATO East-West Contacts Working Group in Washington March 22-24.

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Because of the number of undertakings underway or planned during this reporting period, and since some are also noted in other sections of this report,

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set down in the sub-paragraphs below are examples of programs in the cultural and educational fields in which the US participates.

3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture.

Extension of Relations; Mutual Knowledge;

Exchanges and Dissemination

The US bilateral negotiations with Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, mentioned above, mark the main new ground broken in the extension of cultural relations by means of official agreements between states. Within the framework of existing arrangements, however, programs are also evolving in new directions of interest to us. The Fulbright lecturer program with the USSR, for example, is making headway despite some bureaucratic growing pains on the Soviet side. Likewise, on December 18, the Soviets gave us approval in principle for a special bicentennial exhibit in the USSR. Under the Exchanges Agreement, the

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exhibit, "Technology for the American Home," has already been shown in five Soviet cities and was recently opened in Minsk by Senator Edward Brooke.

Illustrative of new arrangements between states and non-governmental organizations during the reporting period is that between Novoexport and Multicom, Inc. of New York to display and sell through American department stores Soviet modern art. The Soviets have also engaged the West German firm Tele-Globe to tape the Bolshoi Ballet's production of Sergei Prokofiev's "Romeo and Juliet" for broadcast around the world. In the US, the program will be shown by CBS in the fall of 1976. In the USSR, the Soviet Melodiya company has put out a recording of Louis Armstrong performing some of his most popular numbers.

Direct contacts and communications among persons, which are fostered by existing exchange agreements, are numerous and include the recent American tours

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by the Soviet conductor Yuriy Temirkano (January 4 - February 1) and by pianists Arkidyyi Sevido (January 4 - 28) and Lazar' Berman (January 11 - February 16). American exchanges include the Roy Clark Country Music Show which played in Riga, Leningrad and Moscow, January 20 - February 21, and Boris Chaliapin, whose art work was exhibited in Moscow and Minsk in November and December of last year. During the reporting period, however, the Soviets refused to accept the soft rock group, America.

Access; Contacts and Cooperation; Fields and  
Forms of Cooperation

The East continues to be very sensitive in regard to the question of access, especially that involving personal contacts. The Soviet press in January, for example, attempted to refute allegations that significant cultural trends, i.e., dissidents, were not reflected in Soviet exhibits and at the same time maintained that control of the flow of information across Soviet borders in this area is in accord with the Final Act. While the Bulgarian

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Foreign Minister claimed in December discussions that his country was loosening up on foreign publications, it was reported during the same time period that Romania issued a directive to its media requiring that presentations on Western culture stress the idea of alienation and the destruction of human values. The latter development has been attributed to Romania's desire to discourage emigration.

As to particular developments in the area of books, the president of the American Association of Publishers (AAP) broached the question of opening an American Book Store in Moscow during his November visit to the USSR. The Soviets in turn have indicated a willingness to participate in a childrens' book exchange, paying the costs for a US exhibit in the USSR if the US is willing to reciprocate the offer. To facilitate access to US books, the AAP during a November seminar on CSCE implementation with the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs recommended the reconstitution of the Informational

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Media Guarantee Program and a conference to take place in Helsinki with the participation of UNESCO, the Department of State and publisher's associations in the Spring of 1976 to develop meaningful programs.

Recently the USSR has expressed a particular interest in exchanges in the field of television programming. It is reported that the Soviets were expecting visits from the president of CBS and representatives of educational television in January and that the State Committee for Radio and TV has been awaiting the selection of programs outlined in an earlier discussion with representatives of PBS.

4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education.

Extension of Relations; Access and Exchanges;  
Science

The major developments during the reporting period in the educational field under extension of relations, access and exchanges evolved out of the December review talks with the Soviet Union. Soviet representatives proposed an increase in the number of graduate student exchanges from 50 to 55 for 1976-77.

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Likewise, they seconded the US desire to expand direct university to university exchanges. As noted in the First Report on CSCE Implementation, a US-Soviet seminar on higher education is scheduled to open at Princeton March 15. Among other things, the seminar will touch upon the question of degree equivalencies, a topic already discussed at an October 21-24 meeting in Helsinki which was sponsored by UNESCO.

While the question of science in regard to education has also been dealt with in the section of this report on Basket II, it should be noted that as a result of the eleven bilateral, specialized agreements we have with the USSR more than a thousand scientists and specialists visited each other's country last year. The productive exchange agreements in this area with Poland and Romania also contribute towards fuller implementation of the Final Act's section on science as regards education, as should successful completion of the aforementioned agreements with Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

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Foreign Languages and Civilization; Teaching  
Methods

The National Defense Education Act, as noted in the last report on CSCE, continues to be a prime vehicle for fulfilling the provisions of the Final Act with regard to language and civilization studies. Within the US-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement US officials proposed during the December review talks that the annual summer exchange of teachers of English and Russian be increased from the current exchange of 32 teachers from each country to 37. The International Visitors Program, established in 1975 to bring selected Soviet leaders to the US for several weeks, is also making a new contribution to mutual understanding.

As to teaching methods, twelve American educators participated in the first US-Soviet seminar on early childhood education in Moscow on November 28 - December 13.

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E. FOLLOW UP TO THE CONFERENCE.

During the reporting period some CSCE states began to turn to the question of the Belgrade follow-up meetings to the Conference to begin in 1977. The first of these is a preparatory meeting which will convene on June 15, 1977; the second should begin before the end of that year. The rules of procedure for the follow-up meetings will be the same as those of the CSCE, which means the rule of consensus will apply. At the meeting in late 1977 implementation of the CSCE results will be considered and some new proposals are likely to be raised by Eastern, Neutral and perhaps also by Western states. Both Finnish and Polish diplomats recently indicated to us their governments' views that the 1977 meetings would be lengthy and would deal with several new proposals. The Pole, clearly under instructions, estimated on January 13 that as many as fifty substantive proposals might be made, and claimed that Eastern countries would propose an item which would be unpleasant for the West in response to every proposal the West introduced which would be embarrassing for the East.

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Recent indications of activity indicate that the Neutral states are especially active in policy formulation on the 1977 Belgrade meetings. According to a January 20 report, Finland, Austria and Switzerland plan to meet soon to coordinate their preparations for Belgrade. An article by a high-level Yugoslav Communist Party foreign policy specialist, published in mid-January, called for undefined "new initiatives" in 1977, evidently related to new proposals the Yugoslavs have in mind. Additionally, a Romanian Communist Party functionary told a State Department official on November 20 that the primary subject Romania will raise at Belgrade is the institutionalization of follow-up. Perhaps the most extreme statement on follow-up during the reporting period was by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek who, in a November 11 speech, raised the question of another CSCE.

We reported the Polish diplomat's comments noted above to the NATO Allies and asked them to inform us of any Eastern views on follow-up they may receive.

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In individual exchanges on follow-up we have stressed the need for review of CSCE implementation at the Belgrade meetings, and have indicated that any further proposals and follow-up arrangements should be considered in the light of that review.

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F. PREAMBLE AND FINAL CLAUSES OF THE FINAL ACT.

Applicability of Final Act to Berlin.

Considerable care was taken during the CSCE by the Bonn Group powers to ensure that the benefits of the Final Act would also apply to Berlin and its residents. A clause in the preamble to the Final Act states that the signatories are determined "to give full effect to the results of the Conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results." At the concluding stage of the CSCE the leaders of the US, Great Britain, France and the FRG called attention to this phrase and its significance for Berlin, in order to place on record their interpretation of its meaning. Moscow has never formally accepted this interpretation. An article in Pravda on February 10 expressed the view that CSCE has brought many advantages to West Berlin and complained that the West Berlin authorities had not provided full information on what West Berlin is doing and plans to do to implement the provisions of the CSCE.

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This article could be seen as an implicit acknowledgment that the results of the CSCE apply also to Berlin, but it also suggests that the USSR and the GDR will continue to resist automatic applicability to Berlin of agreements reached with the FRG.

Publication of the Final Act.

The Eastern states have made the publication and dissemination of the Final Act, which is covered under the final clauses of the Act, a matter of CSCE implementation policy. Noting that through publication in their national press the Final Act was disseminated much more widely than in the West, Eastern media and spokesmen, including Brezhnev in his December 9 speech at the Polish Communist Party Congress, claim their countries have implemented the clause on publication and dissemination satisfactorily and the West has not.

We have replied that in the US the Final Act is available to the public through the Government Printing Office and the State Department, that copies will be continually kept in stock to meet demand, and that

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the US has carried out its undertakings under the terms of the Final Act on publication and dissemination of the Act within the means at its disposal. As to non-governmental publication, we note that the full text of the Final Act has appeared in the September 1975 number of "International Law Materials", a bi-monthly publication of the American Association of International Law, which is subscribed to by lawyers and institutes of law.

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